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THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
By Edwin Brown Firmage *
T h e  N eed
On March 13, 1969, the United States Senate by a vote of 83 to 15 con­
sented to the ratification of a treaty described as “ the most important 
international agreement brought before the U. S. Senate since the North 
Atlantic Pact” 1 and “ the most important international agreement limit­
ing nuclear arms since the nuclear age began. ’ ’ 2 Assuming a timely entry 
into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may 
delay incarnation of the specter which “ haunted” John F. Kennedy:
I see the possibility in the 1970’s of the President of the United 
States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have 
these [nuclear] weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger 
and hazard.8
The consequences of nuclear diffusion, and by inference the basic pro­
phylactic purposes of any treaty banning proliferation, were seen by 
President Kennedy:
I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to 
have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries 
large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, 
scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone 
then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective dis­
armament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental 
war and increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves 
in what otherwise would be local conflicts.4
To be effective, a non-proliferation treaty must prohibit both the produc­
tion of nuclear weapons by presently non-nuclear-weapon states and the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by states which do not have the capacity to 
produce their own. The former problem is increasingly acute as nations 
continue to develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Over 40 non- 
nuclear-weapon states have operating nuclear reactors. Ninety-nine new
* University of Utah College of Law.
1 Statement of Senator John Sparkman, Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonprolifera­
tion of Nuclear Weapons before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. at 2 (1968).
2 Message from President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Senate on the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 9, 1968; 62 A.J.I.L. 954 (1968).
s “ Text of President Kennedy's News Conference on Foreign & Domestic Affairs,”  
New York Times (Western ed.), p. 4, col. 7, March 22, 1963.
* Hearings on the Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments bef or# th« Houst 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 28 (1968).
nuclear power units have been recently announced. Since plutonium is 
both the by-product of nuclear reactors used for peaceful purposes such as 
generation of electric power or desalination, and the ingredient of nuclear 
weapons, a dilemma is posed: How do we reap the benefits of peaceful 
application of nuclear energy and avoid the specter of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons? Conservative estimates project that by 1985 there will 
be sufficient nuclear power reactors producing enough plutonium as a by­
product to peaceful endeavors to produce 20 nuclear bombs a day.5 This 
potentially uncontrolled production of plutonium will result without or 
beyond any planned program directed at the production of nuclear 
weapons. The possibility for clandestine production of such weapons 
is obvious.
Many nations presently possess the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. 
The limiting factors relate much more to technological and industrial ca­
pacity rather than theoretical knowledge. If decisions are made by certain 
states to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, a geometric rise 
in the number of nuclear-weapon states might take place due to the snow­
balling effect such decisions would have upon potential enemies in various 
areas of regional tension.
The Atomic Energy Commission has reported that many nations could in­
dependently produce a few 6irudimentary nuclear explosive devices” with 
unsophisticated means of delivery. Seven nations 6 have the capacity to 
manufacture nuclear weapons and relatively sophisticated delivery systems 
within five to ten years from the time of a national decision to do so. 
Sixteen others 7 possess slightly less capacity but could also produce such 
weapons and means of delivery roughly within the same time span.
Without question the major purposes of the treaty relate to the preven­
tion of nuclear war. However, a not inconsiderable accomplishment of the 
treaty, if it is successful, will be the prevention of the diversion of badly
s Nuclear reactors are fueled with natural uranium. Plutonium, a major element in 
nuclear weapons, is produced as a by-product of this process. See Speech by Under 
Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, April 26, 1968, 1968 Proceedings, American 
Society of International Law 274.
“ B y 1985 the world's peaceful nuclear power stations will probably be turning out 
enough by-product plutonium for the production of tens of nuclear bombs every day. 
This capability must not be allowed to result in the further spread of nuclear weapons. 
The consequences would be nuclear anarchy, and the energy designed to light the world 
could plunge it into darkness.”  Message from President Lyndon B. Johnson, note 2 
above.
e Australia, Canada, Federal Eepublic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan and Sweden. 
Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, 
at 31.
7 Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Israel, Nether­
lands, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Republic, and 
Yugoslavia. Ibid.
For other projections on world megatonnage, numbers and names of nations poten­
tially capable of joining the nuclear club in the next twenty years, see Kahn and Wiener, 
The Year 2000 (1967); Sir John Cockcroft, “ The Perils of Nuclear Proliferation , ’ ’ 
and David Inglis, “ The Outlook for Nuclear Explosives, 9y in Unless Peace Comes 
(N. Calder, ed., 1968).
712 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 63
needed resources into weapons production.8 Secretary General U Thant, at 
the request of the General Assembly, appointed a body of experts to 
determine the costs of nuclear weapon development.9 The findings of this 
body were that a moderate program involving the manufacture of 100 
20-kiloton plutonium devices over ten years would cost $188 million. Gas­
eous diffusion plants and development of thermonuclear weapons would 
be much more expensive. The biggest expense by far is not the explosive 
device but the delivery vehicle. While the treaty does not prohibit de­
livery vehicles possessing no bombs, warheads or other explosive devices, 
presumably most states will not produce a sophisticated delivery system 
without nuclear teeth. 30-50 jet bombers, 50 MRBM’s and 100 plutonium 
warheads cost $1.7 billion. 20-30 thermonuclear weapons, 100 IRBM’s 
and 2 nuclear submarines cost $5.6 billion. French expenditures for nu­
clear military capacity in 1969 are estimated at $8.4 billion.10
T h e  P a s t  11
The first attempt to negotiate an agreement controlling atomic energy, 
the Baruch Plan,12 proposed an international authority, the International 
Atomic Development Agency, to own or control all 1 1 dangerous ’9 atomic 
materials from the mining process through manufacturing to the finished 
product. The IADA would have possessed sweeping inspection rights into 
those aspects of atomic energy which were not to be given it by monopoly. 
The United States offered to destroy its nuclear weapons and give its in­
formation and equipment to the IADA.
While the United States was by this proposal offering to give up a tre­
mendous (though temporary) strategic advantage, its monopoly of nu­
clear weapons, the Soviets saw this proposal as an attempt to insure that 
they would never possess nuclear capacity. Since the IADA was to be a 
United Nations organ, and since Western Powers at that time controlled
s See the comparative statistics on world military expenditures at p. 733 below.
»United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, International Negotiations 
on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 93-94 (1969) (hereinafter 
cited as International Negotiations).
io Ibid.
n  The best analysis of early U. S. arms control negotiations is in Bechhoefer, Post­
war Negotiations for Arms Control (1961). For an analysis of the r61e of arms control 
and disarmament in Soviet foreign policy, see Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 
1964-1968 (1969), and Edwards, Arms Control in International Politics (1969). For 
an analysis of postwar attempts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, see 
Firmage, “ Anarchy or Order? The Nth Country Problem and the International Rule 
of Law,”  29 Missouri Law Rev. 138 (1964).
12 See Department of State, 1 Documents on Disarmament: 1945-1956 (Pub. No. 
7008). The Baruch Plan: Statement by the United States Representative [Baruch] to 
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1956, pp. 7-16 (1960). For 
the best account of the origin of the Baruch Plan, see Department of State (Pub. No. 
2702), The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy (1946). 
Also see Department of State (Pub. No. 3161), The International Control of Atomic 
Energy: Policy at the Crossroads (1948); (Pub. No. 2498), The Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report (1946).
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a preponderant majority of the votes in every United Nations organ, the 
Soviets saw little difference between this and outright United States control.
The negotiations on the Baruch Plan centered upon the chronology of 
nuclear disarmament by the United States and inspection under the IADA, 
the United States insisting upon inspection before disarmament, the 
U.S.S.R. demanding nuclear disarmament preceding inspection and control. 
While this prolonged debate continued, technological developments were 
rendering the plan untenable. In 1949 the Soviets exploded their first 
atomic bomb, to be followed in 1954 by a hydrogen device. As stockpiles 
of nuclear and thermonuclear bombs multiplied, the concept of international 
ownership as a prevention of proliferation became increasingly impossible 
of accomplishment. Following the Soviet explosion of a hydrogen device, 
international ownership was dropped from the arms control proposals of 
the United States.
In the same year in which the Baruch Plan was proposed, Congress acted 
to insure that the one state then possessing nuclear weapons would not 
spread such weapons to other nations. The McMahon A ct13 and the legis­
lation which succeeded it, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 
1958,14 prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons in foreign commerce. These 
statutes permitted international co-operation in peaceful uses of atomic 
energy, and the transfer of fissionable material and certain non-nuclear 
parts for nuclear weapons to an ally who had made “ substantial progress 
in the development” of nuclear weapons.15 This exception was aimed pri­
marily at the United Kingdom which, together with Canada, had partici­
pated in the Manhattan Project. The basic prohibition upon the “ trans­
fer” of nuclear weapons was to become a central part of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
While our first proposal looking toward a multilateral treaty prohibiting 
the transfer of nuclear weapons was part of a package offered in 1957,16 as 
early as 1954 the Federal Eepublic of Germany undertook not to manu­
facture nuclear weapons in its territory upon becoming a member of 
NATO and the Western European Union.17
President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Speech 18 led to the creation of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1956.19 The IAEA
13 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755-775, 42 U.S.C.A. $$2011-2296.
14 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2121; 72 Stat. 276.
i slM d. at §91(c), 42 U.S.C. $2121 (c) (1964).
is Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1957-1959, Proposals for P ar­
tial Measures of Disarmament 868-870.
it Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, London, Sept.-Oct., 1954: Protocol I I I  
to the Treaty of Brussels creating the Western European Union. 49 A.J.I.L. Supp.
134 (1955).
is U.N. General Assembly, 8th Sess., Official Records 443 (1953).
is International Atomic Energy Agency Statute, 1956, 8 U. S. Treaties 1093; T.I.A.S., 
No. 3873; 276 U.N. Treaty Series 3 (1956); 51 A.J.I.L. 466 (1957). For analyses of 
the Statute, See Bechhoefer and Stein, “ Atoms for Peace: The New International 
Atomic Energy Agency/ 9 55 Mich. Law Rev., 747 (1957); Firmage, note 11 above; 
Stoessinger, “ The International Atomic Energy Agency: The F irst P h a se /’ 13 Int. 
Organization 394 (1959).
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is a United Nations organ with powers relatively autonomous from its 
parent body. It is composed of most of the Member States of the United 
Nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Its purposes 
are to promote the peaceful application of atomic energy and prevent di­
version of fissionable material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weaponry. 
This Agency is charged with the responsibility of administering the safe­
guards system of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Articles III and XII of the IAEA Statute provide for a system of safe­
guards to prevent diversion of nuclear material. The safeguards system 
applies mandatorily to specified types of fissile material and facilities sup­
plied a beneficiary state by the Agency (or by another state which has 
delegated safeguards functions to the Agency, as has the United States 
in its bilateral agreements since 1962). Under Articles III and XII, the 
Agency has extensive powers over its projects or bilateral or multilateral 
projects under IAEA safeguards, including: (1) access to all records of 
the project; (2) limited control over by-products; (3) a given number of 
inspections in the recipient states by IAEA inspectors at the Agency’s 
own timing; (4) the right to suspend or terminate assistance on the ground 
of non-compliance; and (5) the duty to report non-compliance to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly.20
Another method of impeding proliferation of nuclear weapons is the 
creation of nuclear-free zones. The first such proposal was made by Polish 
Foreign Minister Eapacki for a denuclearized zone in central Europe.21 
Like so many other proposals concerning this crucial area, the plan was 
a victim of cold war tension. The extent to which the world has been 
forced to retreat from the major battlefields of the cold war to find suita­
ble geography to denuclearize is seen by the fact that the first nuclear-free 
zone was created in Antarctica by treaty in 1959.22 The 1967 Latin Ameri­
can Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 23 will create a nuclear-free zone in that 
area. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty 24 includes an agreement forbidding 
the placement of nuclear weapons “ in orbit around the Earth” or their 
installation “ on celestial bodies” or their stationing “ in outer space.”
A major advance toward the accomplishment of effective international
20 See Firmage, note 11 above, at 144-147.
21 See Address by the Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki) to the General Assembly, 
Oct. 2, 1957, in Documents on Disarmament: 1957-1959, note 16 above, at 889; Note 
and Memorandum from the Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki) to the American Am­
bassador (Beam), Feb. 14, 1958, Ibid. at 944; News Conference Remarks by the 
Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki) Regarding an Atom-Free Zone in Central Europe, 
Nov. 4, 1958, ibid., at 1217.
22 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U. S. Treaties (1961) 794; T.I.A.S., No. 
4780; 402 U.N. Treaty Series 71 (1959); 54 A.J.I.L. 477 (1960).
23 XJ.N. Doc. A/C.l/946 (1967). The United States and the United Kingdom signed 
Protocol I I  providing that both states would respect the treaty 's aims not to use or 
to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties.
24 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, T.I.A.8., 
No. 6347 (1967); 61 A.J.I.L. 644 (1967). See Larson, note 11 above, at 145-147, for 
an analysis of Soviet strategy on the treaty.
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laws proscribing nuclear proliferation was made in the 1963 Partial Test 
Ban Treaty.25 This treaty prohibited nuclear weapons tests in the atmos­
phere, in outer space, and under water. It was directed not only at the 
elimination of atmospheric pollution and radioactive fall-out but, perhaps 
more importantly, at impeding the development of nuclear weapons by 
making nuclear weapons-testing more costly and difficult.
Negotiating the Treaty
Both the United States and the Soviet Union included non-proliferation 
proposals within their disarmament packages in 1957.26 In 1958 and 1959 
Ireland introduced resolutions in the General Assembly supporting an in­
ternational agreement prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons.27 A 
similar Irish resolution was passed by the General Assembly in 1961.28
From 1957 through the summer of 1966, the major difference between 
Soviet and U. S. drafts of a non-proliferation agreement concerned the 
permissibility of nuclear sharing arrangements within a regional organiza­
tion such as NATO. The United States demanded that provision be made 
in any non-proliferation agreement that a concept such as the Multilateral 
Force (MLF) be permitted if the total number of states or organizations 
possessing nuclear weapons were not to be thereby increased. That is, 
nuclear weapons would not be transferred to a regional organization un­
less a nuclear-weapon state within that grouping transferred its entire 
nuclear force to such a regional organization. The United States argued 
that no proliferation would occur in that the number of entities possessing 
nuclear weapons would remain constant. The United States draft treaties 
submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) at 
Geneva in August, 1965,29 and March, 1966,30 would have allowed such a 
regional force, while the Soviet draft of September, 1965,31 would not. 
However, events within the United States and in Europe soon eliminated 
this major point of difference.
The United States had proposed the MLF as a means of partially ful­
filling any felt need of West Germany for the possession of nuclear weapons, 
while at the same time avoiding proliferation or independent German con­
25 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Underwater, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U. S. Treaties (1963) 1313; T.I.A.S., No. 5433; 480 
U.N. Treaty Series 43 (1963); 57 A.J.I.L. 1026 (1963).
27 U.N. Doc. A/Res/1380 (XIV) (1959). 26 See note 16 above.
28 General Assembly Res. 1664 (XVI), U.N. General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official 
Records, Supp. 17, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4980/Add. 1 (1961); Department of State, Docu­
ments on Disarmament: 1961, at 693.
29U. S. Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft 
Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Aug. 17, 1965. International Nego­
tiations, note 9 above.
30U. S. Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: 
Amendment to the U. S. D raft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 
March 21, 1966, ibid. at 140.
si State Department, Documents on Disarmament: 1965, Soviet D raft Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 24, 1965, at 443-446.
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trol. The reception of this proposal by our European allies, however, was 
mixed. Basic problems of ultimate control over such a force seemed to 
many to be insuperable. And in the United States, the debate over the 
Pastore Resolution32 commending the President’s efforts to negotiate a 
non-proliferation agreement gave conclusive evidence that the Senate would 
not amend the Atomic Energy A ct33 (which prohibits the “ transfer” of 
nuclear weapons in foreign commerce) to allow United States nuclear 
weapons to be transferred to any proposed MLF. With this timely scut­
tling of the MLF fleet, the major Soviet objection to the United States 
draft treaty was eliminated.
During the next year intensive private negotiations took place between 
William Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
and our representative at Geneva, and Ambassador Roshchin of the 
U.S.S.R., Co-Chairmen of the ENDC. While frequent consultations oc­
curred between the major parties and their respective allies, and with other 
members of the ENDC, the negotiations themselves occurred bilaterally 
rather than within the ENDC.
On August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed 
upon identical texts of a draft treaty and submitted the same, minus a 
safeguards article, to the ENDC.34 The failure of agreement on a safe­
guards article came about because of the existence of two international 
safeguards systems, that of the IAEA and the European Atomic Com­
munity (Euratom). It has been United States policy to work towards a 
“ single, worldwide system of safeguards,” 35 but Common Market coun­
tries feared an abandonment of Euratom and consequently a blow to 
eventual European unity if the IAEA were to perform all safeguards 
functions within Common Market countries. The United States was caught 
between its own goal of a single, world-wide safeguards system, and the 
desire of its European allies to preserve a role for Euratom.
The debate on inspection resulted in strange doctrinal bedfellows. West 
Germany and other Common Market countries wanted inspection by Eura­
tom to avoid industrial espionage and a possible weakening of European 
integration; the Soviet Union, which for years had proposed various meth­
ods of self-inspection in its disarmament schemes, now, quite understand­
ably if not consistently, opposed Euratom inspection as constituting self­
inspection for Common Market countries.36 The U. S. draft treaty of 
August, 1965,37 provided that states would “ cooperate in facilitating the 
application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent inter­
national safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities. ’ ’ 38 There was no 
Soviet equivalent in its corresponding draft, but they had supported the 
proposal of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to accept IAEA
32 S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 Cong. Rec. 10802 (1966).
33 See note 14 above.
34Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 338-341; 62 A.J.I.L.
308 (1968).
se See note 1 above, at 6. se See Larson, note 11 above, at 150,
87 See note 29 above. IWl*
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safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities if the Federal Republic 
of Germany would do the same.89 The Soviet Union regularly attacked 
the Federal Republic on its rejection of this proposal and on other issues 
during the negotiating process.40
On April 27, Foreign Minister Brandt suggested before the Bundestag 
the creation of a “ control system” by which the IAEA would reach agree­
ment with Euratom on verification procedures by which the former would 
satisfy itself that the latter was adequately performing the safeguards 
functions.41 This suggestion was close to the formula eventually agreed 
upon.
One striking feature of the negotiation of the treaty was the degree of 
collaboration between the United States and its European allies throughout 
the process. The safeguards article reflects that collaboration in a par­
ticularly striking way. Prior to the presentation of the first U. S. draft 
treaty of August, 1965, our NATO allies had been carefully consulted 
through the North Atlantic Council. This body gave prior assent to the 
submission of the first draft.42 After talks in October, 1966, between 
President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko, a new 
draft was submitted to our NATO allies in December. Prior to the ne­
gotiations leading to the August, 1967, draft, Mr. Foster made a tour of 
the European capitals—Bonn, Rome, Brussels, and The Hague—to work 
out a compromise on a safeguards article. Following intensive negotia­
tions at other capitals and in Washington, D. C., safeguards proposals were 
presented to the North Atlantic Council. The United States then pre­
sented what amounted to a NATO draft to the Soviet Union. The Soviets 
in turn presented a safeguards draft article based largely upon the NATO 
draft of April 20, 1967. The Soviet proposal was presented to the North 
Atlantic Council and to all Alliance members and Euratom. On January 
18, 1968, a revised draft treaty containing Article III, the safeguards 
provision, was presented to the 13th Session of the ENDC. The safeguards 
provisions had been approved by the North Atlantic Council the preceding 
November.43
The draft of January 18 included, in addition to the safeguards article, 
new articles (Y, VI, and VII) insuring the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
explosions to the non-nuclear-weapon states, obliging the nuclear-weapon 
states to “ pursue negotiations in good faith” toward nuclear disarma­
ment, and recognizing the right of states to conclude agreements creating 
regional nuclear-free zones.44
As early in the treaty negotiations as 1966, non-nuclear-weapon states 
had demanded guarantees from nuclear-weapon states insuring freedom 
from nuclear intimidation or attack if the non-nuclear-weapon states agreed 
to the treaty prohibitions. President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg
8® International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 70.
40 Ibid. at 57. 4i Ibid. at 71.
42 Ibid. at 29. 43 Ibid.
44 Revised D raft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jan. 18, 1968, 
ibid. at 150, 153.
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promised that some sort of guarantee would be given.46 Premier Kosygin 
suggested an article in the treaty committing nuclear-weapon states to re­
frain from use of nuclear weapons against states having no such weapons 
on their territories.46 The wording of this proposal had the usual and 
obvious purpose of attempting to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany 
from NATO defense strategy. The U.A.R., Mexico, and Burma backed 
the Soviet proposal.47
India, understandably concerned about a nuclear China, gave notice that 
it would not sign the treaty unless adequate security guarantees were in­
cluded. External Affairs Minister Chagla told Parliament that India had 
a “ special problem of security against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail’’ 
and would not sign without adequate assurances by the nuclear Powers.48
The United Arab Republic, with the support of Rumania and Switzer­
land, proposed an amendment incorporating the proposal of the Soviet 
Union that the nuclear-weapon states undertake 4 4 not to use, or threaten to 
use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this 
Treaty which has no nuclear weapons on its territory. ” 49 Canada opposed 
this thinly-veiled attempt to force nuclear weapons out of Germany and 
Germany out of NATO. The Canadian proposal called for parallel declara­
tions by the nuclear-weapon states coupled with a United Nations resolu­
tion,50 which was the solution finally adopted. On March 7, 1968, the 
Co-Chairmen and the United Kingdom presented to the ENDC a tripartite 
statement on security assurances in the form of a draft Security Council 
resolution.61
On March 11, the Co-Chairmen introduced a joint draft treaty to the 
ENDC, incorporating suggestions by the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
The preamble was revised to include reference to the Partial Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty clause pledging efforts toward a comprehensive test ban. Ar­
ticle VI was strengthened at Sweden’s insistence, broadening the commit­
ments of the nuclear-weapon states to seek nuclear and conventional dis­
armament agreements.52 The ENDC sent its report, with the Tripartite 
Proposal on Security Assurances and the draft treaty attached, to the 
Twenty-Second General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission on April 24.
The draft treaty became the center of a major debate in the General 
Assembly. On May 1, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 18 other 
states submitted a resolution endorsing the treaty. Japan, Brazil and India 
all raised serious objections. Japan was critical of its disproportionate 
impact upon nuclear-weapon states as contrasted with non-nuclear-weapon 
states. Security problems were still not sufficiently met. The treaty would 
only remain effective if substantial progress was quickly made by the 
nuclear-weapon states toward nuclear disarmament.53 Brazil (later to ab-
*&Ibid. at 73. 
47 Ibid. a t 74. 
49 Ibid. a t 89. 
*i Ibid. a t 112.
46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
80 Ibid. at 89-90.
** Ibid. a t 113; 62 A.J.I.L. 817 (1968).
os International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 118.
stain on the vote on the resolution) criticized the draft treaty on several 
grounds: first, the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices was 
denied the non-nuclear-weapon states; second, no “ tangible commitment” 
to nuclear disarmament had been made by the nuclear-weapon states; third, 
such states were not obliged to place their peaceful nuclear activities 
under IAEA safeguards; and finally, the security assurances were inade­
quate, and formal obligations by the nuclear-weapon states not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon signatory 
states were indispensable.54 India (also later to abstain) announced that 
it would not sign. Ambassador Husain criticized the treaty for not pro­
viding for a cut-off in production of fissionable materials (the prevention 
of so-called “ vertical proliferation” ) and the absence of any requirement 
that nuclear-weapon states accept the safeguards provisions of Article III.55 
India also considered Article VI inadequate; to insure that the nuclear- 
weapon states understood the link between Article VI and the durability of 
the treaty, Ambassador Husain stated that his government favored the pro­
posal suggested by Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani on July 29, 1965, that 
non-nuclear-weapon states would declare a “ moratorium” on the acquisi­
tion of nuclear weapons for a specified time, to be made a permanent re­
nunciation only if the nuclear-weapon states reached agreement on nuclear 
weapons disarmament within that time.56
The sponsors of the May 1 draft resolution presented a revised draft on 
May 28, emphasizing the need for sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
activities and the necessity for quick agreement among the nuclear-weapon 
states for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Twenty additional 
states joined as co-sponsors of the resolution.57 On May 31 the United 
States and the Soviet Union submitted a final draft treaty meeting some 
of the objections raised in the General Assembly debate.58 On June 12, 
the General Assembly adopted the revised resolution by a vote of 95 to 4, 
with 21 abstentions.59
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom submitted 
to the Security Council their proposal for security assurances after the 
Assembly had approved the resolution commending the treaty to the Mem­
ber States. France abstained from voting on the ground that the only 
real security guarantee against nuclear blackmail or aggression lay in nu­
clear disarmament. India took the same position, and in addition stated 
its belief that the Security Council had the responsibility to guarantee
64 Ibid. at 118-119.
65 The United States had previously agreed to accept IAEA safeguards upon “ all 
nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national se­
curity significance. ’9 Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 614r- 
615. The United Kingdom subsequently made a similar declaration. The Soviet Union 
did not.
56 See note 39 above, at 19, 119. 57 Ibid. at 122-123.
58 Ibid. at 123.
59 Ibid. at 125. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States all 
supported the resolution; Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and Zambia voted against it. 
Brazil, Burma, France, India and Spain were among the 21 countries which abstained.
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any state against nuclear attack or blackmail, whether or not the state was 
party to the treaty. The vote in the Council was 10-0, with 5 abstentions.60
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed by 
over 50 countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
United Kingdom, on July 1, 1968, at Moscow, Washington, and London. 
It will enter into force when instruments of ratification have been sub­
mitted by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, 
plus 40 other governments.61
The Treaty 62 
The key articles of the treaty are I and II.63
Ibid. at 127-128. Abstaining were Algeria, Brazil, France, India, and Pakistan, 
ci Ibid. at 129.
62 Paragraphs one to three of the preamble express the importance of preventing 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Paragraphs four and five state the need of and 
confidence in the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. P ara­
graphs six and seven declare the goal of sharing peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The need for further progress toward nuclear 
disarmament is emphasized in paragraphs eight and nine. The last paragraph of the 
preamble reaffirms the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of 
force in international relations:
( ‘ Preamble:
“ The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Parties to the 
Treaty9;
“ Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear 
war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war 
and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
“ Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the 
danger of nuclear war,
“ In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling 
for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear 
weapons,
“ Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
“ Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safe­
guards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and 
special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain 
strategic points.
“ Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear tech­
nology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon 
States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peace­
ful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon 
States,
“ Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are en­
titled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and 
to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of 
the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
“ Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of 
the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament,
“ Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
“ Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning
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Article I deals with the obligations of nuclear-weapon states.64 Such 
states undertake “ not to transfer” nuclear weapons, or control over them, 
1 1 to any recipient whatsoever. ’ ’ This prohibition includes, of course, trans­
fer by one nuclear-weapon state to another. Second, nuclear-weapon states 
are obliged to refrain from aiding non-nuclear-weapon states in manufac­
turing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons. Third, these prohibitions 
apply to nuclear explosive devices designed and intended for peaceful as 
well as weapons purposes. This is necessary due to the similarity in func­
tion and in technology used in the manufacture of nuclear explosives 
whether for peaceful or weapons purposes.
The complete prohibition on transfer of nuclear explosives would seem 
to preclude transfer to international organizations such as the IAEA. It 
has been suggested 65 that the IAEA could fulfill the injunction of Article
V that the peaceful benefits of nuclear explosions be made available to 
non-nuclear-weapon states on a non-discriminatory basis. While it is likely 
that the IAEA will have a role in establishing international standards for 
the performance of such services and could in addition perform adminis­
trative functions in this area, the IAEA would seem to be precluded from
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble 
to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all 
time and to continue negotiations to this end,
“ Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of 
trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from na­
tional arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty 
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
“ Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and 
maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least di­
version for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,
‘ ‘ Have agreed as follows: 9 9
63 < < A rtic le  I
“ Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.”
“ Article I I
“ Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the 
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not 
to manufacture or othenvise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices.”
64 “ Nuclear-weapon states”  are defined as those states which have manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.
65 Note, “ The Nonproliferation Treaty and Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Ex­
plosions,”  20 Stanford Law Rev. 1030, 1035-1037 (1968).
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actual possession of nuclear explosives insofar as they would be transferred 
from a nuclear-weapon state.66
Article II deals with the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states. Such 
states are prohibited from receiving the “ transfer” of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over them, from any transferor. 
Second, such states must not manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or receive any assistance in manufacturing such weapons 
or devices.
Articles I and II prohibit transfer “ or control” over nuclear explosive 
devices. The meaning of “ control” or “ access,” the term preferred by 
the Soviet Union, was the cause of a five-year deadlock before final agree­
ment was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States, accord­
ing to Mason Willrich, a former member of the United States Delegation 
to the ENDC.67 The issue behind the semantics was the potential role of 
West Germany in NATO. The Soviets were adamant on the question of 
no “ access” by West Germany to nuclear weapons, through MLF or any 
other institution. The United States was equally firm regarding NATO 
control, unhindered by any non-proliferation agreement, on planning for 
nuclear defense. United States custody of nuclear weapons and release 
arrangements could not be interpreted to violate any agreement until an 
actual release had been accomplished. The Soviets finally agreed to word­
ing permitting a continuation of NATO planning and participation based 
on the status quo. This would require no change in United States or 
West German participation in NATO but would preclude the creation of 
a Multilateral Force.68
66 A nuclear-weapon state would be prohibited by Art. I  from transferring nuclear 
explosive devices to the IAEA, since the language of Art. I, unlike Art. II, precludes 
transfer “ to any recipient whatsoever,,, without regard for a status of statehood or 
treaty membership.
67 Willrich, “ The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Tech­
nology Confronts World Politics,”  77 Yale Law J. 1447, 1465 (1968). See also Willrich, 
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control (1969).
68 Secretary Rusk, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ‘ ‘ The 
treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. I t  prohibits 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever of nuclear weapons or control over them, meaning 
bombs and warheads. I t  also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices, 
because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a 
weapon or can be easily adapted for such use. I t  does not deal with, and therefore
does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control 
over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. 
I t  does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as 
no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results. I t  does not deal with ar­
rangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not 
involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a de­
cision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling. 
And, it  does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar suc­
cession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former 
components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external 
security functions, including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external 
security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental func-
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However, while a Multilateral Force is not permitted under the treaty, 
an interpretation has been made by the United States, distinguishing be­
tween “ transfer,” the key word of Articles I and II, and “ succession.” 
The former is prohibited, while the latter, which could involve an inte­
grated European state emerging from several now in existence, is not.69
“ Nuclear weapons” are defined to include nuclear warheads for missiles, 
or nuclear bombs. This term has not been interpreted to include non­
nuclear explosive devices which may become part of nuclear explosive de­
vices, such as delivery systems, or nuclear power reactors in Polaris sub­
marines. The Nassau agreement, whereby the United States makes available 
Polaris missiles without warheads to the United Kingdom, is thus not 
affected by the treaty.70
Article I I I 71 contains the safeguards provisions. Its purpose is to verify
tions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would 
bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any 
recipient, including a multilateral entity.”  See Hearings on the Treaty on the Non­
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, a t 5-6.
60 Ibid . 70 Ibid.
71 “ A rtic le  I I I
“ 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party  to the Treaty undertakes to accept safe­
guards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the Inter­
national Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose 
of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a 
view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article 
shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being 
produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such 
facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or 
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of 
such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
“ 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for 
the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear- 
weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material 
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
“ 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner de­
signed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic 
or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful pur­
poses in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguard­
ing set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
“ 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article 
either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States de­
positing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotia­
tion of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such 
agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of 
initiation of negotiations. 9 9
compliance with treaty provisions that nuclear materials used for peaceful 
purposes by non-nuclear-weapon states not be diverted to nuclear weaponry.
Non-nuclear-weapon states agree to accept safeguards upon source or 
special fissionable material “ in all peaceful nuclear activities, within the 
territory” of the state, “ under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its 
control anywhere.” These safeguards are applied for the sole purpose of 
verification of compliance with treaty obligations. The safeguards are to be 
set forth in agreements to be “ negotiated and concluded” with the IAEA 
in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system.
Paragraph two of Article III prohibits the parties from providing source 
or special fissionable material, or equipment or material for processing, use 
or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon 
state for peaceful purposes, unless subject to safeguards.
Paragraph three of Article III insures that safeguards will not unduly 
hamper the peaceful development of nuclear power by non-nuclear-weapon 
states in accordance with Article IV.
Paragraph four prescribes the manner in which safeguards agreements 
are to be concluded. Non-nuclear-weapon states may conclude such agree­
ments individually or multilaterally (i.e., Euratom) in accordance with the 
Statute of the IAEA. Negotiations on agreements are to commence within 
180 days after the treaty’s entry into force and be concluded within 18 
months after the initiation of negotiations.
The safeguards system of the treaty is not designed to insure compliance 
with the provisions of Articles I and II relating to non-transfer and re­
ception of nuclear weapons.72 Nor will it detect a clandestine weapons 
production system apart from non-nuclear-weapon states’ programs of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Further, the safeguards system is not 
applicable by treaty provision to peaceful nuclear activity within nuclear- 
weapon states. What the safeguards are designed to accomplish is the 
verification of compliance with treaty prohibitions against diversion of 
fissionable material from peaceful nuclear programs to nuclear weapons 
programs or other nuclear explosives programs within non-nuclear-weapon 
states.
Though limitations exist regarding the scope of the safeguards provisions 
of the treaty, they will still have profound effect upon the non-nuclear- 
weapon states. Since safeguards are applied “ on all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities” within the territory 
or under the jurisdiction or control of such states, the entire peaceful nu­
clear industry of the non-nuclear-weapon states will be covered.
Throughout the negotiating period many non-nuclear-weapon states were 
critical of the proposed safeguards provisions as being discriminatory, 
since only the non-nuclear-weapon states were to be affected by the safe­
guards provisions. Sweden, Canada, Rumania, Brazil, India, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Spain made especial objections upon this point.73
While Article III does not require the application of safeguards to the
72 See Willrich, 77 Yale Law J., note 67 above, at 1447-1480.
73 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 101.
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peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon states, on December 2, 1967, 
President Johnson announced that the United States would accept IAEA 
safeguards upon “ all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding 
only those with direct national security significance.” 74 The United King­
dom announced two days later that it would do the same.75 The U.S.S.R. 
has made no similar commitment.
With the voluntary placement of the peaceful nuclear industry of the 
United States and the United Kingdom under the IAEA safeguards sys­
tem, together with the application of that system to the peaceful nuclear 
industries of all non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty, a giant 
step will have been taken toward the creation of a body of international 
law governing the conduct of the world peaceful nuclear industry. This 
must be recognized as a major beneficial result of the treaty. One major 
purpose in United States sponsorship of the IAEA at its beginning was 
to effect this very purpose.76 In large measure, the safeguards system of 
the IAEA was based upon the safeguards provisions of United States bi­
lateral agreements with states receiving our aid in developing their peace­
ful nuclear industries.77 Now this goal of world-wide recognition and 
application of standardized international regulations to the peaceful nu­
clear industries of the world is within reach. That this is absolutely 
essential if nuclear anarchy is to be avoided is seen from the fact that total 
nuclear generating capacity by 1980 is estimated to be 300,000 megawatts. 
As of 1967, only 65 reactors in 29 countries having a total thermal capacity 
of 3,200 megawatts, had safeguards agreements approved by the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA.78 This represented less than 8% of the thermal 
capacity of civilian reactors then operating.
The IAEA safeguards system79 includes an intricate system of accounting 
and inventory reporting by the recipient state to the IAEA, coupled with 
IAEA access to specified locations where nuclear facilities exist to permit 
physical verification of the reports.80 The frequency of inspections is de­
termined by the potential military significance of the facility. If the 
reactor is capable of producing more than 60 kilograms of plutonium per 
year it is open to inspection by the Agency without advance notice.81 The 
IAEA safeguards system includes a review of the design facility, dis­
closure of accounting records, a system of reports to the Agency, physical
7*Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 614-615; for a com­
ment on this matter, see Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, note 1 above, at 11.
75 Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 616.
7« See Firmage, note 11 above, at 152-154. 77 Ibid.
78 Statement by the Director-General, IAEA, Sept. 26, 1967, to the General Conference.
7® For the Safeguards Document, see IAEA, GC(IX)/294 (1965). For an analysis 
of the background and content of both the IAEA and United States safeguards sys­
tems, see the statement of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, in the Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
note 1 above, at 97, 99-105. See also “ Analysis of IAEA Safeguards System,”  
ibid. at 277.
so Ibid. si IAEA, GC(IX)/294 (1965), Annex, par. 57.
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inspection for verification, provision for numbers of physical inspections, 
and seals upon the core of the reactor to detect diversion.
The relationship between the IAEA and Euratom caused some delay in 
negotiation and debate between the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
the four Common Market countries participating in the negotiations.82 
The United States has always favored a single system of safeguards. How­
ever, the Common Market countries feared that the elimination of Euratom 
with its similar safeguards system would do damage to eventual European 
integration. The Soviets viewed Euratom inspection as self-inspection 
for the Common Market countries. The issue was resolved by allowing 
member states of Euratom to utilize the option in Article III providing 
for agreement to be made with IAEA “ together with other States in 
accordance with the Statute” of the IAEA. The Statute provides for 
“ relationship agreements” between the IAEA and organizations such as 
Euratom which provide the same services regarding safeguards provisions 
as the IAEA. However, to meet the Soviet objections, provision was made 
in Article III that any agreement between a state or groups of states must 
allow the IAEA in effect to monitor the Euratom safeguards, which must 
also be in harmony with the IAEA Statute and safeguards system. The 
IAEA-Euratom relationship, while yet to be worked out in detail, was 
described by the United States at the ENDC:
In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make 
appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that 
under such mutually-agreed arrangements IAEA can satisfy itself that 
nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.83
Article I V 84 insures that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as 
affecting the right of all parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful pur­
82 See analysis above, a t p. 717. See also the remarks of William Foster, Director, 
TJ. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and our representative at ENDC, in 
International Negotiation, note 9 above, at 70-73, 81-82, 101-103.
83 Statement of ACDA Deputy Director, Adrian Fisher, Jan. 18, 1968, ENDC/PV.357, 
at 14, 17. See also Mr. Fisher’s testimony, Hearings on the Arms Control and Dis­
armament Act Amendments, note 4 above, at 61-62. In addition, see “ AEC Com­
parison of Euratom safeguard system and the IAEA System,”  Hearings on the Treaty 
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, at 266.
84 <1 A rtic le  IV :
“ 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right 
of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I  and 
I I  of this Treaty.
“ 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to par­
ticipate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the 
Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together 
with other States or international organizations to the further development of the 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes especially in the territories of 
non-nuclear-weapon States Party  to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs 
of the developing areas of the world.”
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poses, within the limitations of Articles I and II. Nnclear-weapon states 
are encouraged to aid the development of peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy within non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty, with “ due 
consideration ’ ’ for the needs of developing areas.
In previous drafts the hortatory language of Article IV was in the pre­
amble. This article is too general to impose specific duties upon the 
nuclear-weapon states. During the ENDC discussions on the draft of 
August 24, 1967, Mexico, along with the United Arab Republic and Sweden, 
favored a provision in the treaty imposing a “ duty” upon the nuclear- 
weapon states to aid non-nuclear weapon states in the development of 
peaceful applications of nuclear energy.85 Canada and the United King­
dom argued that the term “ duty” was too broad and could be interpreted 
to mean that a nuclear-weapon state would be forced to respond to any 
request by any non-nuclear-weapon state.86 The new Article IV which 
appeared in the January 18, 1968, draft represented a degree of compro­
mise, as the language remained hortatory, but was made slightly more con­
crete and was moved from the preamble to the body of the treaty.87
Article V 88 provides that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosive de­
vices be made available on a non-discriminatory basis and at the lowest
85 Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 394-395.
86 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 83.
87 For a short description of present and possible future peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and nuclear explosions, see the speech by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
Fordham University Club of Washington, D. C., May 2, 1968, “ Gaining the Full 
Measure of the Benefits of the Atom,”  reprinted in 58 Dept, of State Bulletin 632 
(1968).
There has not been the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the 
underdeveloped areas that such nations expected after President Eisenhower’s “ Atoms 
for Peace”  speech. The sound concept of peaceful applications of nuclear energy was 
oversold to the extent that developing nations thought that they could be brought into 
the industrial 20th century without going through the stages of industrialization that 
Western nations have experienced. The realization that a significant industrial base 
must first be had before meaningful uses of atomic energy could be enjoyed has pro­
duced understandable disillusion and hostility. However, genuine attempts to aid the 
developing nations in their application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are 
being made. From 1958 to 1963 the ratio of research contract funds granted by the 
IAEA to institutes in developing countries rose from 23% to 65%. In 1966, 75% of 
all research contract funds of the Agency were awarded for research in developing 
countries. IAEA, GC(XI)/362 (1967) Annex B, par. 19.
ss “ Article V
“ Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, 
in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications 
of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party  to 
the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the 
explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research 
and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party  to the Treaty shall be able to 
obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, 
through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear- 
weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after 
the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party  to the Treaty so 
desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 9 9
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possible cost, without charge for research and development, to non-nuclear- 
weapon states parties to the treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon states are pre­
cluded by Article II from receiving or manufacturing nuclear explosive 
devices for peaceful as well as for weapons purposes. Article V is a neces­
sary consequence of that denial, making available to the non-nuclear-weapon 
states parties to the treaty the benefit of nuclear explosions for peaceful 
purposes. Explosions are to take place under appropriate international 
observation. Non-nuclear-weapon states can obtain such services pursuant 
to international agreement, through an international organization or by 
bilateral agreement with a nuclear-weapon state.
Like Article IV, the general purpose of Article V was expressed in the 
preamble in early drafts of the treaty but found its way into the body at 
the insistence of non-nuclear-weapon states.
The United States proposed in 1966 that the nuclear-weapon states 
perform peaceful nuclear explosive services for the non-nuclear-weapon 
states.89 The prohibition in Article II on reception, manufacture or use 
of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful as well as weapons purposes was 
considered necessary due to the similarity in technology employed in the 
manufacture of nuclear explosives for either purpose. Immediate oppo­
sition to this prohibition quite understandably arose, however, on the part 
of several non-nuclear-weapon states, including India,90 Germany,91 and 
the United Arab Republic.92
The United States and the Soviet Union had originally favored an agree­
ment separate from the treaty to work out problems of nuclear explosions 
for peaceful purposes.93 The only reference in the August 24, 1967, draft94 
to insuring that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosive devices be made 
available to non-nuclear-weapon states was in the preamble. Though 
Brazil and India registered strong opposition to any prohibitions against 
the possession and use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes,95 
the Co-Chairmen of the ENDC, the United States96 and the Soviet Union,97 
maintained that such a prohibition must exist if the treaty were effectively 
to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. While most delegates agreed 
with the Co-Chairmen, there was strong feeling that there should be treaty 
specification of means of sharing the benefits of devices for peaceful nu­
clear explosions. Mexico 98 and Nigeria99 made specific proposals for such 
a provision.
The revised draft treaty of January 18, 1968,100 reflected the criticism 
of ENDC members in that a new Article V brought into the body of the
8» International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 63.
90 Ibid. at 58. 0i Ibid. at 63-65.
«2 Ibid. at 67.
»3Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 172-176.
94 H id. at 338-341. 95 m d .  at 369-370, 546-547, 436-437.
96 See statement of ACDA Director Foster, ENDC/PV.330, p. 5.
Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, Statement of Ambassador 
Roshchin, 518.
»8 m d .  at 395-401. m b id . at 557-558.
ioo See International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 150.
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treaty language which had previously been in the preamble. Each party 
was obligated to co-operate in insuring that potential benefits from peace­
ful nuclear explosive devices be made available to non-nuclear-weapon 
parties on a non-discriminatory basis without expense for the cost of re­
search and development.101
The draft treaty of January, 1968, permitted bilateral arrangements for 
the accomplishment of peaceful nuclear explosive services directly between 
non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon states, as well as permitting multi­
lateral arrangements. Several states opposed this permission of bilateral 
arrangements for such services on the grounds that clandestine and perhaps 
discriminatory agreements could be made if all nuclear explosive services 
were not subject to international control. Canada,102 Sweden 103 and the 
U.A.R.104 were in agreement with this objection. The United States and 
the Soviet Union refused to consider the elimination of any provision for 
bilateral arrangements. However, Article V was revised in the draft treaty 
of May 31, 1968,105 to incorporate a Mexican proposal that precedence in 
placement of wording be given to multilateral arrangements for peaceful 
applications for nuclear explosions, as opposed to bilateral arrangements, 
which was grudgingly accepted by several smaller Powers which satisfied 
their frustration at being unable to eliminate the bilateral option by plac­
ing it last in wording.106 Non-nuclear-weapon states favoring exclusively 
multilateral arrangements for the acquisition of nuclear explosive services 
have the assurance in the treaty that such benefits will be made available,
101 The TJ. S. negotiating team was motivated by an understandable desire to avoid 
any specific and open-ended commitment to provide nuclear explosive services upon 
demand and the technological necessity of forbidding any nuclear explosive device to 
non-nuclear-weapon states. The position of such states as India and Brazil against 
any provision prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosive devices is equally understandable. 
Both states continually maintained that such a provision would render non-nuclear- 
weapon states perpetually dependent upon nuclear-weapon states for the performance of 
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The extent of this dilemma can be seen by 
comparing the statements made by the representatives of Brazil and India, which con­
tinued unchanged by the decision to make provision for such services a part of the 
treaty (see International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 104), with the following state­
ment from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report recommending Senate consent 
to ratification:
“ The committee wishes to record its concern at the open ended commitment implied 
in Article Y. We suggest that obligations under this provision should be undertaken 
only after the fullest consultation with appropriate congressional committees and should 
be limited to projects within the capacity of the United States consistent with its 
interests. Moreover, the committee specifically reject any suggestion that article Y 
constitutes an across-the-board pledge by the United States to support foreign and 
domestic commercial research and development projects. As in the case of nuclear 
services projects, research and development projects should be undertaken only after 
the public interest has been carefully defined by the appropriate congressional com­
mittees., ,  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons., Senate Bep. No. 9, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968).
102 ENDC/PV.358, at 19-20. ios ENDC/PY.364, at 5-7.
104 ENDC/PV.367, at 12.
ios See International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 120, 122.
io« Ihid. a t 123-124.
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whether by bilateral agreement with a nuclear-weapon state or by agree­
ment with an international organization, “ under appropriate international 
observation and through appropriate international procedures. ’9107
While opinions vary on the extent of sacrifice made by non-nuclear- 
weapon states in agreeing to forgo the development of nuclear explosive 
devices for peaceful purposes,108 as new uses for nuclear explosions are 
discovered and techniques are improved on present uses with a consequent 
lowering of costs, more nations will feel the pressure for the full realiza­
tion of such benefits. Article V must work well or this source of pressure 
could lead to the eventual breakdown of the treaty. As has been noted, 
Brazil was one of several countries strongly opposing the provisions of 
Article II (and hence the necessity of Article V) prohibiting non-nuclear- 
weapon countries from possessing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful 
purposes. Brazil has shown considerable interest in linking the Amazon 
and the Rio de la Plata by use of nuclear explosives.109 Brazil was largely 
responsible for the inclusion of a provision in the Latin American Nuclear 
Free Zone (LANFZ) Treaty110 permitting parties to carry out explosions 
of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.111
107 See note 88 above. The general outlines of U. S. planning for providing such 
services were presented by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com­
mission, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
“ When particular applications are found to be feasible, we plan to make a nuclear 
explosion service available on a commercial basis to domestic users and to nonnuclear 
weapon parties to the NPT. Such a service would include the fabrication of the 
nuclear explosive device, its transportation from the assembly plant to the project site, 
its emplacement at the prepared site, and its arming and firing. The service would 
also include appropriate technical reviews of the proposed detonation, such as those 
relating to health and safety. The users of the service, whether it  is furnished do­
mestically or pursuant to article V, will pay for the service in accordance with rates 
established for its various elements. . . . the charges for the nuclear explosive devices 
used in furnishing the service will not include the cost of their research and de­
velopment.
“ . . . . The objectives of the treaty could not permit any observation contemplated 
by the treaty to include access by the observers to the design or internal operation of 
nuclear explosive devices. Consequently, there will be no transfer of nuclear explosive 
devices or control over them; nor will the service, in any way, assist, encourage, or 
induce any nonnuclear weapon state to manufacture or to otherwise acquire nuclear 
explosive devices.”  Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, note 1 above, a t 104.
i°8 Speech by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, note 5 above: “ Even 
an optimistic assessment of its potential uses would not justify the enormous expendi­
ture of time, money and scientific and technical talent required to develop nuclear de­
vices for this purpose alone. 9 9
He later spoke of the “ economic absurdity of a country’s developing nuclear ex­
plosives solely for peaceful purposes . . .
loo Koop, “ Plowshare and the Nonproliferation Treaty,”  12 Orbis 793, 809 (1968). 
no See note 23 above.
i n  Art. 18 of LANFZ states th a t: * * Contracting parties may carry out explosions 
of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices 
similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or collaborate with third parties for the 
same purpose.”
Many other states, including Japan, Australia, and Canada, have ex­
pressed deep interest in this use of nuclear energy. While oil and gas 
recovery is probably the most realistic short-term prospect for peaceful 
uses of nuclear explosions, many other possibilities are now being tested 
by the United States Plowshare program.112 From the use of nuclear ex­
plosives in the construction of a sea-level Atlantic-Pacific canal replacing 
the Panama Canal113 to the use of nuclear explosions to break copper ore 
bodies to permit direct recovery of copper,114 nations will continue to ex­
plore the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Nuclear-weapon states, and 
whatever international body (presumably the IAEA) is utilized to perform 
functions under Article V, have the responsibility to see that its provisions 
are fairly and adequately met if for no other reason than the likelihood 
that the failure to do so could lead to the ultimate failure of the treaty.
The single most important provision of the treaty, however, from the 
standpoint of long-term success or failure of its goal of proliferation pre­
vention, is Article VI.115 While the basic prophylactic provisions are in 
Articles I and II, the credibility and integrity of those provisions will, 
in time, be no better than the performance of the nuclear-weapon states 
under the provisions of Article VI.
Article VI obliges all parties to undertake negotiations to seek the cessa­
tion of the nuclear arms race and accomplish nuclear disarmament.
The compelling need for compliance with this provision is based first 
of all upon its pre-eminent status as a prerequisite to world peace. What­
ever the validity in the past of the argument that weapons are a mani­
festation rather than a cause of war, that position holds little weight in an 
age of weapons of total destruction. John F. Kennedy recognized this fact.
Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause 
of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons—ten million times 
more destructive than anything the world has ever known, and only 
minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror, of dis­
cord, and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must
112 For analyses of Project Plowshare, see Hearing on the Peaceful Application of 
Nuclear Explosives—Plowshare Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Inglis and Sandler, A Special Report on Plowshare, Prospects 
and Problems: The Nonmilitary Uses of Nuclear Explosives, Bulletin of Atomic Sci­
entists 46-53 (Dec., 1967); Koop, note 109 above; Van Cleave, “ The Nonprolifera­
tion Treaty and Fission-Free Explosive Research,”  11 Orbis 1055 (1968); Note, “ The 
Nonproliferation Treaty and Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosions,”  note 65 
above.
113 This would necessitate an amendment to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
Dr. Seaborg stated that provisions of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would per­
mit excavation-type projects but trans-isthmian canal projects would necessitate treaty 
amendment. See note 107 above, a t 105.
n4 Koop, note 109 above, at 801.
u s  “ Article VI
“ Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control.”
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await the settlement of all disputes—for disarmament must be a part 
of any permanent settlement.116
Second, the economic burden of armaments is increasing at a time when 
the domestic economic needs of nations are becoming increasingly acute. 
Global expenditures for military purposes rose from $132 billion in 1964, 
$138 billion in 1965, and $159 billion in 1966, to $182 billion in 1967.117 
This is 40% more than world-wide expenditures by governments on edu­
cation,118 and three times the world expenditures on public health.119 It 
is estimated that since the turn of the century more than $4,000 billion 
have been spent on wars and military expenditures. If the current level 
of military spending continues, this will double in 20 years. If the rate of 
increase continues, it will double in ten years.120
Military expenditures are increasing in relative as well as in absolute 
terms. Such expenditures are increasing faster than the gross national 
products of the world,121 and are growing significantly faster than the 
population. Since 1964 the world has experienced a 7% increase in popu­
lation and a 38% rise in military expenditures.122
The third and most immediately relevant necessity for compliance with 
Article VI, in terms of the treaty, would be the pressures upon, and con­
sequently the reactions of, the non-nuclear-weapon party states. The nu­
clear-weapon states cannot ask of the non-nuclear-weapon states their 
eternal forebearance from the acquisition of nuclear weapons while the 
former maintain their position of immense power over the latter by reason 
of such weapons. The treaty will have continued adherence only if nego­
tiations bring meaningful agreements to end the nuclear arms race and 
some movement toward nuclear disarmament.123
The fact that Article VI has its place in the treaty is a testament to the 
tenacity of the non-nuclear-weapon states in demanding some form of quid 
pro quo for their renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Prior 
to the draft of August 24, 1967, India, Brazil, the Scandinavian countries, 
Canada, the U.A.E. and Germany brought strong pressure to bear upon the 
Co-Chairmen to obtain some statement within the treaty regarding nuclear 
disarmament.124 The United States and the Soviet Union resisted with 
equal tenacity the attempts to link the treaty to other aspects of arms con­
trol. The Co-Chairmen stated the positions of their states, based on years 
of unproductive disarmament negotiations upon package proposals which 
included the concept of “ complete” disarmament, that the present draft
116 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States— John P. Kennedy, 1961­
62, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 25, 1961, at 620.
H7 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expendi­
tures, Research Report 68-52, at 1 (1968).
u s  IUd. no IU d . at 2.
120 IU d . 121 H id .
122 Ibid.
123 gee the statements of Lord Chalfont of the United Kingdom and General Burns 
of Canada at the ENDC, ENDC/PV, 299, at 7-8, 16.
124 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 74-75.
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represented the extent of possible agreement at that time and should not 
be delayed pending agreement upon other matters.125 The three aspects of 
nuclear disarmament mentioned most often by the non-nuclear-weapon 
states were an agreement ending the production of fissionable materials (in 
nuclear parlance, the “ cut-off” ), a comprehensive test ban agreement, and 
an agreement halting the production of delivery systems.126
The draft of August 24, 1967, represented a moderate advance for the 
cause of the non-nuclear-weapon states in that its preamble called for the 
achievement of a “ cessation of the nuclear arms race” at the “ earliest 
possible date.” 127 But most ENDC members thought that this concept 
should be made more specific and be lodged in the body of the treaty. 
Brazil called the August draft “ one-sided and discriminatory” for its great 
demands upon non-nuclear-weapon states and minimal demands upon nu­
clear-weapon states.128 Mexico proposed an amendment in the form of a 
draft treaty article stating that nuclear-weapon states agreed to “ pursue 
negotiations in good faith” toward agreements on a comprehensive test 
ban, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the elimination 
of existing stockpiles, and the elimination of existing nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems.129 The U.A.R., Canada and Sweden supported this amend­
ment. Rumania proposed a similar amendment.130
The draft of January 18, 1968, represented another advance for the non- 
nuclear-weapon states. New Articles VI and VII were added to the body 
of the treaty, with the general language being taken from the preamble, 
made more specific and added to the treaty as separate articles. Article
VI obliges the parties to “ pursue negotiations in good faith” toward an 
agreement ending the nuclear arms race and the accomplishment of a treaty 
on ‘ ‘ general and complete disarmament. ’ ’ 131 This article was based upon 
the Mexican amendment but deleted the specific topics of disarmament 
called for in that amendment. Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden proposed that 
Article VI be amended to include “ at an early date” in reference to 
future disarmament negotiations, that the word “ nuclear” be added before 
“ disarmament” and that a reference to the comprehensive test ban be in­
cluded in the preamble. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Mexico, the U.A.R., 
Nigeria, Bulgaria and Canada supported this proposal as amended by the 
United Kingdom.132 This was accepted by the United States and the Soviet 
Union 133 and became part of the joint draft treaty of March 11, 1968.134
As the United States and the Soviet Union make policy decisions regard­
ing the implementation of Article VI, serious consideration should be given
125 H id . 126 lU d. at 75-76, 106.
127 See the identical drafts of the United States and the Soviet Union, ENDC/192 
and ENDC/193. International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 146. See also 62 A.J.I.L. 
308 (1968).
128 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 86.
129Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 395-401.
13017 Congressional Quarterly 303 (Feb. 28, 1969).
131 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 150, 153.
132 IMd. a t 106. 183 Ibid. at 107.
isHMd. at 155-158.
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to that topic which generated the most heated exchanges between the Co­
Chairmen of the ENDC and three of its most outspoken members, Brazil, 
India, and Rumania. These exchanges occurred over the long-standing 
issue of the failure of the draft treaty to halt so-called “ vertical prolifera­
tion,” the growth of fissionable materials stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon 
states. The United States and the Soviet Union warned that any attempt 
specifically to link the issue of a cut-off of fissionable production to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty would indefinitely delay the latter. India and 
the other states restated their position that the treaty would break down 
without movement toward a cut-off. The position of both sides is rational 
and not incompatible as long as immediate progress is now made toward 
the implementation of Article VI.
Serious movement by the Soviets and the United States toward the im­
plementation of the purpose of Article VI, even prior to the ratification 
of the treaty by enough states to bring it into effect, will probably be of 
critical effect upon the decisions of key states such as India, Japan and 
Germany on the question of ratification.
The Soviet Union and the United States must realize that the non-nuclear- 
weapon states cannot be placated by anything similar to the partially cere­
monial “ first steps” of the past, denuclearizing Antarctica, the atmosphere, 
outer space and under sea, while “ vertical” proliferation goes unchecked 
and basic political agreements concerning central Europe, the U.S.S.R. and 
the United States are delayed. The messages to the ENDC from Presi­
dent Nixon and Soviet Premier Kosygin, March 18, 1969, regarding an 
agreement barring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from 
the seabed, while of some substance, cannot be taken as a meaningful con­
tribution to the fulfillment of Article VI. At some point “ first steps” of 
peripheral importance must lead to agreements of substance. If not, they 
are potentially more damaging than helpful in that they give the illusion 
of progress and allay pressures which might otherwise lead to real accom­
plishment. The place to begin now might well be the negotiation of an 
agreement on the cut-off of fissionable materials production and the eventual 
reduction of existing stockpiles.
Another substantial contribution to the fulfillment of Article VI would 
be an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to 
prohibit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. Questions were 
raised by Senators Gore, Fulbright and Cooper in hearings before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed United States ABM 
system as to whether such a system “ violated the spirit” of Article VI.135 
The contrary may very well be true. It is reported that President Nixon 
has assured Ambassador Dobrynin that the United States is willing to 
negotiate on an ABM limitation which could be effective well before any 
hardware could be placed in Montana or North Dakota.136 If the option 
of negotiating out of the deployment of ABM systems by the Soviet Union
135 17 Congressional Quarterly (No. 9) at 303 (Feb. 28, 1969).
iso James Reston, New York Times, p. 40 M, cols. 5-8 (March 19, 1969).
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and the United States was a serious motivation behind the recent decision 
to deploy such a system, the United States might well be proceeding toward 
the implementation of Article VI by the most productive form of nego­
tiations.
Though many might consider the decision to proceed toward deployment 
of an ABM system as an obstacle to negotiation with the Soviet Union, in 
the opinion of this writer the opposite conclusion is more likely to be correct. 
This is not to say that the actual deployment of such a system is militarily 
or politically wise or unwise, workable or unworkable. But as a process of 
negotiation it might be essential.
Sir William Hayter, formerly British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
described the process of negotiation with the Soviets:
Negotiation with the Russians does occur, from time to time, but it 
requires no particular skill. The Russians are not to be persuaded by 
eloquence or convinced by reasoned arguments. They rely on what 
Stalin used to call the proper basis of international policy, the cal­
culation of forces. So no case, however skillfully deployed, however 
clearly demonstrated as irrefutable, will move them from doing 
what they have previously decided to do; the only way of changing 
their purpose is to demonstrate that they have no advantageous 
alternative. . . ,137
The Soviets, when faced with the visible and physical evidence that we 
intend to proceed with the development and deployment of an ABM sys­
tem, may well be more amenable to negotiation than if we were to make 
it known that we had made a unilateral decision to avoid such a system. 
The notion that our decision will be taken as an unfriendly act with their 
consequent refusal to bargain is contrary to past experience.138 The en­
vironment for negotiating with the Soviet Union will be set when both 
sides are convinced that neither has anything to gain by the deployment 
of such a system, because both will possess them, thus serving only to
!37 As quoted in Acheson, Sketches From Life of Men I  Have Known 105 (1961).
138 < < Historically, the foreign affairs of Eussia have developed along lines entirely 
different from those of the United States. Our most important foreign relations, his­
torically speaking, have been along the lines of peaceable overseas trade. These have 
set the pattern of our thinking on foreign affairs. The Russians, throughout their 
history, have dealt principally with fierce hostile neighbors. Lacking natural geo­
graphical barriers, they have had to develop, in order to deal with these neighbors, a 
peculiar technique (now become traditional and almost automatic) of elastic advance 
and retreat, of defense in depth, of secretiveness, of wariness, of deceit. Their history 
has known many armistices between hostile forces; but it has never known an example 
of the permanent peaceful coexistence of two neighboring states with established 
borders accepted without question by both peoples. The Russians therefore have no 
conception of permanent friendly relations between states. For them, all foreigners 
are potential enemies. The technique of Eussian diplomacy, like that of the Oriental 
in general, is concentrated on impressing an adversary with the terrifying strength 
of Eussian power, while keeping him uncertain and confused as to the exact channels 
and means of its application and thus inducing him to treat all Eussian wishes and 
views with particular respect and consideration. I t  has nothing to do with the culti­
vation of friendly relations as we conceive them.”  G. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 
at 560 (1967).
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escalate potential warfare to a higher level while leaving the relative posi­
tions of the two principals unchanged. Dean Acheson has stated that:
Negotiation should not be, as some conceive it, mere talk apart from 
action. Negotiation and action are parts of one whole. Action is often 
the best form of negotiation. It affects the environment, which in 
large part is likely to determine the outcome of negotiation. The sput­
niks were powerful moves in negotiation; so was the Marshall Plan.139
The Soviets are more likely to be impressed by imminent deployment than 
by skillful debate or friendly gestures.
The wisdom of ultimate deployment of an ABM system may well be dis­
puted. The ability of such a system to offer real protection to missile 
sites or cities may be questioned. But the decision to move toward the de­
ployment of such a system may well have made the ultimate necessity of 
such deployment less likely. The answer to this will depend upon the 
initiation and the success of negotiations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States.140
Another major step toward nuclear arms control would be accomplished 
by an agreement prohibiting (or reversing) deployment of the MIRV 
system and its Soviet equivalent. This system is potentially much more 
destabilizing than ABM.
Article V II141 provides that nothing in the treaty affects the rights of 
the parties to conclude regional agreements establishing nuclear-free zones. 
The essence of this article had first appeared in language in the preamble. 
A Mexican proposal142 that the language be placed in the treaty in the 
form of a separate article was accepted by the Soviet Union143 and the 
United States.144
Amendment procedures and provision for conferences of review are 
contained in Article VIII.145 Paragraph one, based upon a similar pro­
139 See note 137 above, at 104.
1*0 Cf, Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, Statement of ACDA 
Director Foster before the ENDC, Sept. 19, 1967, in defense of the Johnson Adminis­
tration decision to deploy a limited system, at 402.
141 “ A rtic le  V II
“ Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude re­
gional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respec­
tive territories.,,
142Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 395-401.
143 H id. at 515-521. 144 H id. at 513-515.
145 “ A rtic le  V III
“ 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which 
shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if  requested to do so by one- 
third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such 
an amendment.
“ 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of 
all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party  
to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, 
are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
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vision in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, requires the depositary 
governments to convene a conference to consider an amendment if requested 
to do so by one-third or more of the parties to the treaty. Paragraph two 
provides that an amendment shall enter into force after ratification by a 
special majority comprised of a majority of the parties to the treaty, in­
cluding all nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty and all parties 
which on the date of the amendment are members of the Board of Gov­
ernors of the IAEA. An amendment will be of force only between the 
parties ratifying it.
Paragraph three makes provision for a review conference to be held five 
years after the treaty enters into force. Further conferences may be held 
at five-year intervals if requested by a majority of the parties.
The August 24, 1967, draft146 had provided that an amendment would 
enter into force for all parties after approval of the qualified majority. 
Rumania,147 Nigeria 148 and Canada 149 had objected to this on the ground 
that consent should be the source of any treaty obligation and without 
such consent to an amendment the disapproving states should not be bound. 
This position was accepted by the Co-Chairmen and the draft text of 
January 18, 1968, and succeeding drafts reflected the change.
Article I X 150 designates the United States, the United Kingdom and
The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of 
ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by 
a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear- 
weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amend­
ment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the 
deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
“ 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to 
the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland in order to review the operation of this 
Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions 
of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of 
the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective 
of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.”
146 Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 338-341.
147 Ibid. at 525-526. 148 Ibid. at 557-558.
149 ENDC/PV.345 at 13.
150 “ A rtic le  IX
“ 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not 
sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this 
article may accede to it at any time.
“ 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of 
the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the 
Depositary Governments.
“ 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Gov­
ernments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States 
signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the 
purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and 
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967,
the Soviet Union as depositaries. The treaty will enter into force upon the 
deposit of instruments of ratification by the depositaries and 40 other 
signatories. This article specifies how states may become parties and pro­
vides the procedures for ratification, accession and registration. All these 
procedures were taken from corresponding provisions of the Partial Nu­
clear Test Ban Treaty.
Article X ,151 again in part based upon the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, permits withdrawal from the treaty upon three months’ notice if 
the party determines that “ extraordinary events” connected with the 
“ subject-matter of this Treaty” have jeopardized the state's “ supreme 
interests.” An additional requirement, not found in the Partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, provides that notice of withdrawal must be given the 
Security Council, specifying the extraordinary events leading to the neces­
sity of withdrawal. Provision is also made for a conference to be held 25 
years after the treaty enters into force, when a majority of the parties 
will determine whether the treaty will remain in force indefinitely or for 
a fixed period or periods.
Although Kumania and Brazil opposed the provision in the treaty re­
quiring a withdrawing state to submit an explanation to the Security 
Council,152 the United States insisted that it remain unchanged for the 
reason that withdrawal from such a treaty would affect the international 
peace and security of other states and consequently should be discussed by 
the Security Council.158
The basic part of the withdrawal provision permitting withdrawal if 
a state’s “ supreme interests” are jeopardized by events connected with 
the treaty makes eminently good sense. A state whose supreme national 
interests are jeopardized by an agreement will either violate it clandes­
tinely or repudiate it. A withdrawal provision permits a less dangerous
“ 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subse­
quent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
“ 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding 
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratifica­
tion or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of 
receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
“ 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to 
article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.”
151 “ A rtic le  X
“ 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to with­
draw from the Treaty if  it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. I t  shall 
give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United 
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a state­
ment of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
“ 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty/ 9
152 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 90-91, 111.
153 ibid. at 111.
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and provocative means to accomplish an end which would be reached in 
any event.
The August 24, 1967, draft154 provided that the treaty be of unlimited 
duration. Italy and Switzerland objected to this on the ground that the 
prospect of scientific advancement of a “ rapid and unpredictable” sort 
made it imperative that the treaty be in force for a specified number of 
years, later to be reviewed and amended, with the threat of lapse acting 
as a powerful encouragement for such amendment.155 The present article 
represented a compromise on duration and first appeared in the January 
18,1968, draft.156
Article XI lists the official languages and texts.157
Sec u r ity  A ssuran ces
The revised draft of January 18, 1968, did not contain any security as­
surances against nuclear blackmail or attack. A number of states, par­
ticularly the Federal Republic of Germany, India and Rumania, had been 
demanding such security assurances throughout the negotiations. During 
the debate on the January 18 draft, the Federal Republic supported a pro­
posal that nuclear-weapon states guarantee non-nuclear-weapon states 
against nuclear blackmail.158 Rumania proposed that nuclear-weapon states 
guarantee that they would not launch or threaten to launch a nuclear at­
tack upon non-nuclear-weapon states.159 The United States responded that 
the subject was too complicated to be dealt with by a treaty provision. Fur­
ther, the United Nations was necessarily involved.160
The Co-Chairmen and a representative of the United Kingdom prepared 
a tripartite statement on security assurances which was presented to the 
ENDC March 7, 1968, as a draft Security Council resolution.161 Nuclear 
aggression was held to “ endanger the peace and security of all States.” 
The Security Council would declare that it recognized that aggression with 
nuclear weapons “ or the threat of such aggression” “ would create a situa­
tion in which the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon state 
permanent members,” would “ act immediately in accordance with their 
obligations” under the Charter. The draft statement further welcomed
154 See note 146 above.
155 Department of State, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, at 527-528, 572-574.
156 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 110.
is? “ Article X I
“ This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. 
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments 
to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
“ In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
“ Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day 
of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.”
158 International Negotiations, note 9 above, at 112.
159 Ibid. iso Ibid.
i6i For the text of the March 7, 1968, draft resolution, see 7 International Legal 
Materials 570 (1968).
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statements by certain states that they would provide assistance 4 4 in accord­
ance with the Charter” in the event of such attack or intimidation. Finally, 
the proposed resolution reaffirmed the “ inherent right” of individual and 
collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.162 The repre­
sentatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom 
stated that their governments would issue security declarations in support 
of the draft resolution.163 On June 19, 1968, the Security Council by a 
10-0 vote approved the tripartite resolution with identical wording as pre­
viously submitted by the three Powers to the ENDC.164 France abstained, 
on the ground that meaningful security could only come after nuclear dis­
armament, but significantly did not cast a negative vote.165
Herman Kahn and Carl Dibble have criticized the approach to avoiding 
nuclear weapons proliferation as manifest in the treaty as tending to freeze 
the super-Power status of the United States and the Soviet Union, at a 
time when multipolar influence and trends are becoming increasingly strong. 
Further, they hazarded a prophecy a year prior to the final draft that the 
treaty would “ increase inordinately United States and Soviet obligations 
by giving sweeping nuclear guarantees to non-nuclear powers without in­
creasing significantly the participation of others in this new form of ‘ col-
162 m a .
163 For the texts of the security declarations of the Soviet Union, the United King­
dom and the United States, see Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, at 43.
164 < ‘ R esolution of Security  A ssurances adopted by th e  United N ations Security  
Council, June  19, 1968
“ The Security Council
“ Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of states to subscribe to 
the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby to undertake not 
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
“ Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these states that, in conjunc­
tion with their adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,
“ Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons 
would endanger the peace and security of all states,
“ 1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggres­
sion against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which the Security 
Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members, would have to 
act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;
“ 2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain states that they will provide or 
support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
state party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim 
of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
“ 3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the 
Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if  an armed attack occurs against 
a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces­
sary to maintain international peace and security.'*
165 Also abstaining were Algeria, Brazil, India, and Pakistan.
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lective’ security. ” 166 The Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­
mittee recommending Senate consent to the treaty reacted to the United 
States declaration and the Security Council resolution as if the prophecy 
of Kahn and Dibble had come true. In recommending Senate consent, the 
Committee emphasized that the treaty was “ separate and distinct” from 
the resolution and declaration:
The committee wishes to make the record clear that support of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty is in no way to be construed as approval of 
the security guarantee measures embodied in the United Nations resolu­
tion or the supporting U. S. declaration.167
As a matter of fact, the Senate committee need not be that concerned. 
Neither the resolution nor the declaration creates nuclear guarantees, 
“ sweeping” or otherwise. Rather, the surprise will come if the Federal 
Republic of Germany or India changes its attitude toward the treaty on 
the basis of those documents, which do not add or detract one point from 
previous commitments. The Security Council resolution adds no more as­
surances to non-nuclear-weapon nations than they would possess by reason 
of the Charter. The operative language of the resolution refers to “ ag­
gression” or the “ threat of aggression” with the use of nuclear weapons 
against a non-nuclear-weapon state. These terms remain undefined. And 
the Security Council is no more bound to act than it would be by the exist­
ing language in the Charter. The veto power remains unaffected. The 
reaffirmation in paragraph three of the resolution of the “ inherent” right 
of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter obviously adds 
nothing new. The only advantage for non-nuclear-weapon states had by 
reason of the declarations and resolution was the affirmation of unanimity 
by the three major nuclear Powers against nuclear aggression or black­
mail. And this goes no farther than the mutuality of interest of those 
nations.168
166 Kahn and Dibble, “ Criteria for Long-Range Nuclear Control Policies,”  55 Calif. 
Law Rev. 473, 478 (1967).
167 See Senate Rep. No. 9, note 101 above, at 10.
168 See the exchange between Senator Margaret Chase Smith and General Earle G. 
Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Hearings on Military Implications 
of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the Senate Com­
mittee on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 22 (1969). General Wheeler assured 
Senator Smith that the treaty in no way increased U. S. security commitments.
Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, testified before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, note 1 above, at 56, that the Defense Department worked closely with the 
Department of State and the ACDA on the wording of the United States declaration 
and the U.N. resolution. He agreed that the statements do not contain any increase 
in our security commitments. Secretary of State Rusk and ACDA Director William 
Foster testified that the Security Council resolution and the U. S. declaration did not 
commit the United States to any additional responsibilities other than those already 
assumed under the U.N. Charter, with the veto power remaining unaffected. See the 
questions of Senators Sparkman, Pastore, Bennett and Case, note 1 above, at 15-16, 34. 
Senator Case asked Secretary Rusk whether the treaty or the declaration and resolution 
in any way increased Presidential power to commit United States forces in the event 
of nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression. Secretary Rusk responded
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Prospects for the F uture
Key states to watch as barometers indicating whether the treaty will 
receive sufficient ratifications to enter into force—and if it does whether 
the “ right” states are parties—are West Germany, Israel, Japan and India. 
All could independently manufacture nuclear weapons. All have serious 
security problems plausibly generating the need for nuclear defense. What 
they do will be of critical importance to the success of the treaty. A snow­
balling effect will follow their action in either direction.
Though the People’s Eepublic of China will undoubtedly not ratify, if 
the treaty is ratified by a large number of states, China’s potential cus­
tomers will largely be prohibited from receiving nuclear weapons. States 
with the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons, such as India, 
Japan, and Israel, will not be likely beneficiaries of Chinese aid, regardless 
of treaty ratification. States closer to China (Albania, North Korea, North 
Viet-Nam, Cuba) are not technologically capable of mounting a nuclear 
weapons program.
The possible effect of the treaty upon United States security alliances 
has been disputed. The treaty has been described as having “ the most 
far-reaching and unsettling effects,” producing “ profound changes” upon 
NATO, including that of denying “ to the United States the option of pro­
viding nuclear assistance to a European nuclear force. 9 9169 Dr. Eobert 
Strausz-Hupe, testifying at the Senate Foreign Eelations Committee hear­
ings, maintained that NATO solidarity was endangered by the priority 
the United States has given arms control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union.170 He urged the Senate to “ reject the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty,” and reject as well “ the package in which it and other measures of 
arms control have been offered to its scrutiny. 9 9171
There can be little doubt that, as Dr. Strausz-Hupe maintains,172 a 
major reason for Soviet support for the treaty specifically, and for Soviet 
participation in arms control talks generally, is its possible impact upon 
the position of the Federal Eepublic of Germany within NATO. In addi­
tion, the treaty is seen by the Soviets as one more hedge against the eventual 
acquisition of nuclear arms by West Germany.173 This is not to say, how­
ever, that Soviet objectives have been accomplished, or even furthered, in­
sofar as West Germany’s position in NATO is concerned. It is difficult 
to see what “ profound changes” the treaty has brought about in the posi­
tion of the Federal Eepublic and NATO.
First of all, United States law 174 and policy forbid the transfer of nu­
clear explosive devices of any type to any country, including our NATO
that neither were formal treaty commitments or Presidential prerogatives altered by 
the treaty, the Security Council resolution, or the U. S. declaration. Ibid. 40-41.
169 “ Reflections on the Quarter,”  11 Orbis 963, 967 (1968).
170 See note 1 above, a t 129-139. 171 Ibid. at 138.
172 See note 169 above, at 967.
i7«See Larson, note 11 above, at 148: Maggs, “ The Soviet Viewpoint on Nuclear 
Weapons in International Law,”  29 Law and Contemporary Problems 956? 964-^68
(1964).
174 See notes 13 and 14 above.
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allies. The treaty does not effect any change in this policy.175 It does 
not prohibit the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems.170 
Neither does it affect in any way the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.177 
The treaty does not prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons owned 
and controlled by the United States within the territory of its NATO 
allies,178 though the 1965 Soviet draft attempted to accomplish this.179 As 
Dr. Strausz-Hupe observed, the ill-fated Multilateral Force would be pro­
hibited by the treaty, for whatever overkill value such a prohibition may 
have. Since that fleet sank as much from well-deserved European scorn 
as American reticence, it is difficult to lament the prohibition. But a much 
more meaningful European federation which would absorb an existing 
nuclear force of a European state would presumably not be prohibited by
175 The following questions were asked by our NATO allies in response to Arts. I  
and II. The official United States response follows each question.
Q.l “ What may and what may not be transferred under the draft treaty?”
A. “ The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.
“ I t  prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of ‘nuclear weapons' or control 
over them, meaning bombs and warheads. I t  also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear 
explosive devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can 
be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.
“ I t  does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear de­
livery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such 
transfer does not involve bombs or war heads.* ’
Q.2 “ Does the draft treaty prohibit consultations and planning on nuclear defense 
among NATO membersf”
A. “ I t  does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so 
long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.”
Q.3 * ‘ Does the draft treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons 
owned and controlled by the United States within the territory of nonnuclear 
NATO members f ”
A. “ I t  does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within 
allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control 
over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the 
treaty would no longer be controlling. ’ 9 International Negotiations, note 9 above, 
at 180.
176 Ibid. See as well the comments of Secretary Eusk, note 68 above.
177 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, appearing before the Senate Foreign 
Eelations Committee, quoted Secretary Clark Clifford's statement to the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group ministerial meeting at The Hague in April, 1968:
“ The U. S. Government holds the view that the entry into force of the Nonprolifera­
tion Treaty will not interfere with the work of the Nuclear Planning Group. The U. S. 
Government intends to continue to pursue actively the work of the Nuclear Planning 
Group and to seek to find solutions satisfactory to its non-nuclear partners in NATO. 
I t  also is the view of the U. S. Government that the Nonproliferation Treaty will not 
hinder the further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the alliance 
compatible with articles I  and I I  of the Nonproliferation Treaty.”
Secretary Nitze added: “ We have also assured our NATO and other allies that the 
treaty would not interfere with any existing nuclear arrangements.9 9 Hearings on the 
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, at 56.
178 See notes 68 and 175 above.
£79Bunn, “ The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,”  1968 Wis. Law Eev. 766, 778.
the treaty.180 Since the treaty prohibits only the 11 transfer” of nuclear 
weapons, the succession by a federated European state to one of its com­
ponent’s previously national nuclear forces would not be proscribed.
The Multilateral Force was mainly designed to placate any European 
desire for national nuclear forces while at the same time keeping com­
pletely centralized {i.e., American) control over Western nuclear forces 
to preserve some degree of restraint and direction in case of nuclear war. 
It would seem that the treaty better achieves the latter goal while remov­
ing much of the competitive impetus from the former. The argument can 
be made that rather than being a divisive influence upon NATO, in fact 
the treaty will have the opposite effect. Germany is presently forbidden 
by a protocol to the Treaty of Brussels 181 from developing nuclear weapons. 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may serve to 
remove what may be taken as a stigma from the Federal Republic by re­
moving the unique nature of this prohibition.
The degree of collaboration between the United States and its NATO 
allies182 during the negotiation of the treaty would seem to belie the asser­
tion of Dr. Strausz-Hupe that the process of such negotiation and the 
content of the treaty will lessen NATO solidarity. It is not doubted, how­
ever, that bilateral arms control negotiations in the past between the Soviet 
Union and the United States have caused such divisions.183
NATO is valuable as it contributes to international security. It is a 
means and should not be treated as if it were an end in itself. It remains 
essentially unaffected by the treaty. Most important, no alliance system 
can provide protection from the dangers inherent in the possession of nu­
clear weapons by a continually growing number of states.
There is no question but that military viewpoints on matters of national 
security connected with the treaty were taken into account at every stage 
of the negotiating process. General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee that 
the Joint Chiefs had made 14 formal treaty proposals since the negotiations 
began. Each resulted in a change in the draft treaty aimed at strengthen­
ing the security interests of the United States and its allies. The Joint 
Chiefs asked that the treaty not “ disrupt any existing defense alliances” 
of the United States; that it not “ prohibit deployment of United States 
owned and controlled nuclear weapons within the territory of our non­
nuclear NATO allies” ; that it not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons by 
the United -States when its national security so demanded; and that the
iso Secretary of State Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that the treaty did not affect the question of European unity; that it “ would not bar 
succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former 
components. . . . While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the 
treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over 
them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity. ’9 Hearings on the Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, at 5-6.
i8i See note 17 above. i82 See discussion a t p. 718 above.
183 See Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (1961).
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treaty not “ involve an obligation for the automatic commitment of United 
States military forces.” They also asked for a withdrawal clause and safe­
guards provisions. General Wheeler reported that every request was met.184 
It is difficult to see how the extension to other nations of prohibitions al­
ready substantially upon the United States 185 is not in our national interest.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was described 
by President Lyndon Johnson as “ a triumph of sanity and of man’s will 
to survive. ’ 9 186 Historians of the future may look upon it as one of the 
two or three great documents of the postwar era. Whether it will be so 
regarded will probably depend upon the implementation of Article YI. 
The basic prophylactic provisions, Articles I and II, are important in them­
selves but are of primary value as instruments through which the world 
may gain a few years’ respite from uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear 
weaponry; years which must be used to control the so-called “ vertical 
proliferation” of the two super-Powers. If Article VI is quickly and 
effectively implemented through agreements leading to missile limitation 
and stockpile reduction, then the pressures upon presently non-nuclear- 
weapon nations to acquire nuclear weapons will diminish. Without such 
agreements the growing pressures upon select non-nuclear-weapon states 
would seem almost inevitably to lead to the eventual failure of the treaty.
184Note 168 above, at 14-15. See also General Wheeler’s testimony in the Hearing 
on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 1 above, at 12. The 
JCS had a liaison officer at the planning sessions, White House meetings, the meetings 
of the Committee of Principals, and at all ENDC sessions. Ibid. at 57; note 167 above, 
at 14-15.
185 See notes 13 and 14 above 186 See note % above,
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